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WILLS AND TRUSTS
by
Charles 0. Galvin*
THE year under review was an active one in the areas of wills and trusts.
Several significant cases were decided by the Supreme Court of Texas, and
several of the cases from ,the courts of civil appeals are before the supreme
court on applications for writ of error. The important lesson to be learned
from these cases is that meticulous draftsmanship and strict adherence to the
formalities attendant upon the execution of wills should be exercised. After
the principal actor in the drama-the testator-is dead, only the documents
are left to speak for him, and they should do so in the clearest possible
terms.
I.

WILLS

Construction. In Welch v. Straach' the testator by a holographic will left
the community homestead to his wife. Later by codicil he provided that the
homestead should "remain in her possession as long as she live [sic] and
remains a widow ....*2 Following the testator's death the widow sold the
homestead. The testator's children contended that the effect of the codicil
was to create a defeasible life estate in the widow and that the children, as
beneficiaries of the residue of the estate, were vested with the remainder in
their father's undivided one-half interest in the homestead, subject only to a
defeasible life estate in their mother. The court held, in spite of the rule
that a devise should be construed as creating the largest estate possible subject only to express words of limitation, that the words "live and remains"
should not be considered together as if the limitation had read "as long as
she lives a widow and remains a widow." Thus, the estate devised to the
widow was construed to be a life estate determinable. In the court of civil
appeals the children contended that the testator specifically intended to leave
the homestead in which he and his wife were living at the time of the execution of the will, and because that homestead had been sold, there was an
ademption of the devise. The court below held that no particular property
was intended and that the words "homestead upon which we are living"
meant the property upon which the testator and his wife were living at the
time of the testator's death.3 The decision of the Supreme court rendered
this issue moot.
* B.S.C., Southern Methodist University; M.B.A., J.D., Northwestern University;
S.J.D., Harvard University. Dean and Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 47 (Nov. 8, 1975), rev'g 518 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1975).
2. 518 S.W.2d at 864.
3. Id. at 868. The general rule in Texas is that a will speaks from the death of the
testator. See 10 E. BAILEY, TEXAS PRACTICE, WILLS § 561 (1968). However, the meaning of the language of the will, including questions concerning the identification of property or beneficiaries, is determined by reference to circumstances as they existed at the
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An interesting mathematical formula was before the court in Price v.
Austin National Bank. 4 The will provided in part that a sum of money was
to be distributed from the testatrix's estate which sum, "less the payments
totaling $25,000 provided for in paragraphs 3a and 3d," when added to the
value of a previously created trust (Trust No. 2) would equal $310,000. She
then proceeded to make provisions for distributions to various persons on the
basis of fractions, the denominator of which was 310. Paragraphs 3a, 3b,
3c, and 3d provided for special payments of $5000, $5000, $5000, and
$10,000, respectively. Paragraph 3e provided for a payment of $57,050 to
a special trust. The court construed the above quoted portions of the will to
be read as "3a through 3d" rather than "3a and 3d" in order to make sense
out of the $25,000 deduction.
The mathematics of the formula were then worked out as follows:
The Value of Trust No. 2
less $25,000 for payments
provided for in paragraphs 3a through 3d
Net Value
Sum to be provided under will for
distribution to named beneficiaries
Amount to be transferred from
decedent's estate

$188,571.15
25,000.00
$163,571.15
310,000.00
$146,428.85

The named beneficiaries contended that the sum of $57,050 provided for in
paragraph 3e should be deducted in addition to the $25,000 so that the final
sum to be distributed would be $310,000, not $310,000 less $57,050. Their
contention was that the testatrix's use of fractions each having a denominator
of 310 clearly indicated her intention of having a, distributable sum of
$310,000, and they sought to introduce extrinsic evidence to corroborate this
asserted intention. The court held, however, that extrinsic evidence was
inadmissible because the formula in the will was unambiguous and should be
applied as written.5 In all probability the testatrix intended to have a
distributable sum of $310,000 to which the fraction would apply; yet, by
inadroit drafting a different result was effected. 6
Goldring v. Goldring7 involved the following critical language for construction:
I give and bequeath to my said son . . . my farm . . . to have and
to hold the same during his life in trust for his four children .... This
clause is intended to create a life interest only to said land . . . in my
time of the execution of the will. See, e.g., Winkler v. Pitreg, 410 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
4. 522 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
5. Thus, the shares which had been expressed in fractions, the denominator of
which was 310, would now be calculated by applying such fractions against the sum of
$252,950 (i.e., $310,000-$57,050), rather than $310,000.
6. The Price court adhered to the well-established rule of Huffman v. Huffman,
161 Tex. 267, 339 S.W.2d 885 (1960), that when the words of the will are so plain
as to be without doubt or ambiguity, the courts must follow the language of the will
and may not speculate that some other result may have been intended.
7. 523 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ dism'd).
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said son and I desire that he take full charge of said land . . . to

use and cultivate and maintain ... and to equitably divide the rentals
...into a fund to be used for

.

.

said minor children ....8

The court construed the language as designating the son trustee for his
children during his life, and upon his death the trust terminated with the
remainder passing to the children. The son had no life interest in the farm;
he acted only as trustee. Moreover, the court interpreted the word "desire"
as having a mandatory effect because it appeared from the entire instrument
that this was an expression of the testatrix's intent in disposing of the property.
In another case involving construction it was held that a joint tenancy
with right of survivorship may be created by express provisions in a will 9 and
that a provision in a husband's holographic will devising "all my property to
my beloved wife . . .to do with as she See fit except that she is not to Sell,

Morage [sic], or Lease any of our real Estate for more than Three (3)
years without the written agreeeement of our son.

.

." devised a fee simple

estate, the restraints on sale, mortgage, and lease being void as restraints on
alienation.
In Wood v. Paulus'° the construction of the words "begotten" and "born"
was presented for judicial determination. The testatrix, Annie, provided
that one-fourth of her estate should be held in trust "for any lawfully
begotten children of my son Claude

. .

. born after my death .

. . ."

Annie

died July 2, 1947, and Mary was born in September 1947 to Claude and his
wife Lilla. Although there was evidence that Claude and Lilla were not
lawfully married when Mary was conceived, the majority reasoned that
"begotten" meant "born" and that "lawfully begotten" meant "born in
wedlock." Because the trial court had taken the case from the jury, the
controversy was remanded for trial to determine if Mary was born in
wedlock. The concurring justice disagreed with respect to the construction
of the word "begotten."'" There was evidence that the testatrix had reason
to accord special treatment to her son Claude and that she intended that
bequests for Claude's children be conditioned upon their being conceived in
wedlock.
Proof of Will. In Hall v. White 12 an instrument dated in 1965 was admitted
8. Id. at 756.
9. Jones v. Preston State Bank, 515 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). See also Ford v. Allen, 526 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1975, no writ).
10. 524 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ refd n.r.e.). See
also Moore v. Wardlaw, 522 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), where it was held that language in a will devising the interest of the testatrix in
a ranch to her three grandchildren subject to a right in her husband to "hypothecate
or dispose of same during his life time" did not constitute a power of appointment in
the husband but rather a power of sale with tracing rights in the grandchildren.
11. 524 S.W.2d at 761.
12. 525 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. 1975). For other cases see Allen v. Nesmith, 525
S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (fact issue
as to whether will was signed by testatrix in the presence of attesting witnesses required
retrial); Stegall v. Harris, 525 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ)
(presumption established that missing will was revoked by testator); Morgan v. Morgan,
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to probate in September 1968, the year of the decedent's death. The
instrument appeared to have been witnessed by Mr. and Mrs. John W.
Weaver. In 1969 a suit was instituted by the brothers of the deceased to
cancel the order admitting the will to probate. After trial in the probate
court the will was upheld, and an appeal was taken to the district court in
accordance with the procedure in effect in 1971. The issue was whether
Mr. and Mrs. Weaver had signed the will as witnesses to its execution in the
presence of the testator. The evidence in the record regarding the Weavers
as witnesses consisted of an affidavit by Mrs. Weaver executed and filed
with the probate court when the will was admitted to probate and the
transcript of her testimony during the contested trial in the probate court.
Section 89 of the Texas Probate Code 13 provides that certified copies of the
record of testimony may be used in evidence, as the original might be, on the
trial of the same matter in any other court. The supreme court construed
this provision as permitting the use of the affidavit and transcript only if the
witness were unavailable. The court held that since Mrs. Weaver was only
temporarily out of the jurisdiction at the time of the trial in the district court,
she was not unavailable, and, therefore, the record of her testimony was not
admissible.
Testamentary Capacity. The cases with respect to testamentary capacity are
largely evidentiary and primarily concern the application of the rule of Carr
v. Radkey1 4 that a witness may not make conclusionary statements about
the testator's mental capacity to make and publish a will but may testify as
,to whether or not the testator had the capacity to know the objects of his
bounty, the nature of the transaction in which he was engaged, the nature
and extent of his estate, -and similar questions. On the basis of testimony of
witnesses on these matters the court in Williford v. Masten"5 held that a jury
could have properly found that the testatrix was not of sound mind. There
was evidence of the testatrix's forgetfulness, her inability to comprehend her
estate, and her lack of knowledge of the consequences of signing a will. In
Hamill v. Brashearl6 there was testimony from the testatrix's attorney, accountant, legal secretary, banker, doctor, and others supporting the existence
of testamentary capacity at the time of execution of the will and codicils
thereto. In Bettis v. Bettis' 7 there was evidence of the advanced alcoholism
of the testator and the testimony of two psychiatrists and a doctor of internal
medicine that the testator, who signed his will in January 1973 and
thereafter died in March 1973, lacked testamentary capacity. On the other
hand, an attorney who had done legal work for the testator, -a former
519 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (evidence supported
finding that will had not been revoked); In re Estate of Kirby, 516 S.W.2d 284 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (words in instrument that "we will proceed
to have papers drawn up" did not indicate testamentary intent); Bibbs v. Massey, 516
S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ) (forgery).
13. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 89 (1975).
14. 393 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1965).
15. 521 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
16. 513 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
17. 518 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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employee and witness to the will, -the attorney who drafted the will, and
others testified as to the testator's capacity to make a will.

The court

rejected the contestant's argument that because of the testator's chronic
alcoholism his testamentary capacity was to be determined solely by expert
medical testimony. On the basis of all the testimony there was evidence to

support a jury finding of testamentary capacity.' 8
Joint and Mutual Wills. In Morris v. Texas Elks Crippled Children's
Hospital, Inc.19 Mr. and Mrs. Denny executed a joint will in 1941 leaving
all their properties to one another with remainders over for the benefit of
certain nieces and nephews. Mrs. Denny died in 1950 and the will was filed
for probate. In 1961 Mr. Denny executed a new will leaving his estate to
his nephew, except for a ranch in Terrell County which he left to the
appellee hospital for endowment. The nieces and nephews named in the
1941 will did not learn of the 1961 will until 1972. The dispute concerned
whether the 1941 will was both joint and contractual. If so, and the
survivor sought to make a new will leaving the properties to others, the
beneficiaries under the contractual will could impose a constructive trust on
the properties. The court held that the language of the 1941 will clearly
showed a comprehensive plan for the disposition of the properties owned by
Mr. and Mrs. Denny, and, therefore, each had acted in consideration of the
other's act.2 0 The period of the statute of limitations did not begin to run
until the beneficiaries under the 1941 will discovered their rights; 21 accordingly, they were entitled to recover the ranch less certain monies paid by the

hospital.

22

Election.23

Lewis v. Campbell24 concerned the question of whether the

18. See also Findley v. McWhorter, 526 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975,
no writ) (evidence supported testamentary capacity); Cravens v. Chick, 524 S.W.2d 425
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, write ref'd n.r.e) (evidence raised issue of testamentary capacity to be resolved by jury on retrial); Denbo v. Butler, 523 S.W.2d 458
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ) (under Dead Man's Statute sister
of deceased could not testify as to testamentary capacity and undue influence); Dearmin v. Smallwood, 520 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ) (evidence
supported finding of unsound mind); Rodriguez v. Garcia, 519 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (evidence supported findings that elderly
uncle did not have mental capacity to understand the execution of deeds and that niece
had used undue influence upon him).
19. 525 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
20. However, the court was careful to note that the mere presence of a joint will
does not raise a presumption that there is a contractual relationship. Id. at 876.
21. The dissent argued that the statutes of limitation relating to adverse possession
were operable and that title to the land was perfected by operation of those statutes.
Id. at 881.
22. For other cases involving joint wills, see Reynolds v. Park, 521 S.W.2d 300
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (evidence sufficient to raise issue of
fact as to the contractual nature of joint will executed in 1953; later 1970 will could
not alter rights under earlier contractual will); Dickerson v. Keller, 521 S.W.2d 288
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (under joint will survivor had complete power of disposition; other beneficiaries had only a contingent remainder); Orsburn v. Miller, 521 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ) (wife's
admission that will was contractual conclusively established that will was contractual);
In re Estate of Jordan, 519 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(joint will construed as leaving life estate with power of disposition to survivor and remainder to church).
23. The principle of election is based on the notion that one who accepts benefits
under a will must accept the whole will. See Philleo v. Holliday, 24 Tex. 38 (1859).
24. 520 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
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testator sought to dispose of all the community property or only his undivided one-half interest. If he intended to dispose of all of it, then his surviving
wife would be put to an election to take under the will or take her share by
law. The critical language read: "[W]e have accumulated a community
estate and it is now my intention to dispose of whatever community property
and whatever personal property I may own at my death in this will."' 25 The
court held that the language should be construed to refer only to the
testator's interest in the community estate; therefore, no election was re26
quired.
Settlement Agreement.

In Box v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance

Co. 27 decedent and his first wife entered into a property settlement agreement pursuant to divorce in which a certain life insurance policy was to be
kept in effect for the 'benefit of their children. Thereafter, in addition to
borrowing against the policy, the decedent changed the beneficiary, naming a
woman who later became his second wife. The court held that -the net
proceeds of the policy after deducting the loan and attorneys' fees should be
awarded to the children who possessed an equitable interest in the policies
superior to that of the second wife. The court further held that the amount
of the loan which was deducted from the proceeds could be recovered from
the decedent's estate.

Muniment of Title. Section 89 of the Probate Code2s provides that if
the court finds ,that a will should be admitted to probate and that administration is unnecessary, the court may admit such will to probate as a muniment
of title. In Washington v. Law29 it was held that the trial court did not err
in admitting a will as a muniment of title where the evidence showed that
avoidance of multiple administration of the same property was the reason for
finding no necessity of administration.
Statute of Limitations. In Price v. Estate of Anderson" o Price was injured

while riding as a passenger in an automobile driven by Anderson. The
accident occurred on July 13, 1968, and suit was brought a few months later.
Anderson died on December 3, 1968. His attorneys filed a suggestion of
25. Id.
26. The law not only presumes that a testator intends to dispose of his property
alone, but that a will shall not be construed to dispose of property not owned by the
testator unless that result is shown by clear and unequivocal language. See Davis v.
East Texas Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 163 Tex. 361, 354 S.W.2d 926 (1962); Avery v. Johnson, 108 Tex. 294, 192 S.W. 542 (1917).
27. 526 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See
also Jernigan v. Scott, 518 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), where the court held that the plaintiff, claiming to be the surviving wife and
entitled to community property rights, was bound by an earlier separation agreement.
28. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 89 (1975).
29. 519 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
30. 522 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1975). See also Jennings v. Srp, 521 S.W.2d 326 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ), where it was held that parties who stand to
gain or lose in a will contest are indispensable parties. In spite of the language of TEx.
R. Civ. P. 39, courts seem to be adhering to the traditional labels. However, see Cooper
v. Texas Gulf Indus., 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974), noted in 52 TEXAS L. REV. 1410
(1974), and discussed in Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
29 Sw. L.J. 265, 270 (1975).
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death in accordance with rule 152 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,3 1
and on October 13, 1969, they filed a motion to dismiss for failure to join
necessary parties within a reasonable time. On October 16, 1969, Echols
was appointed temporary administrator of Anderson's estate, and the order
authorized the temporary administrator to accept service of process, notify
insurance carriers, and retain counsel in personal injury claims against the
estate. Price took a nonsuit on June 8, 1970, and on July 10, 1970, she
instituted another suit naming as defendant "The Estate of Welton Terry
Anderson." The petition alleged that the estate might be served with
process through Echols, the temporary administrator. Echols was served,
and his attorney filed on behalf of the estate various answers and motions,
including on July 9, 1973, a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action
was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Price then amended her
petition to name both the estate and the temporary administrator as defendants. The temporary administrator answered with a general denial and
motion to dismiss, alleging that he was an indispensable party to the suit and
that suit against him was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court
rendered a take-nothing judgment against -theplaintiff Price, and the court of
civil appeals affirmed.
The supreme court reversed and remanded for trial on the merits. The
court grounded its decision on policy reasons; the purpose of a statute of
limitations is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time so that -the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend while
witnesses are available and the evidence is fresh in their minds. In the
instant case the original petition was filed within the period of limitation and
citation was served on -the administrator. Although the administrator was
not named as defendant, he was fully cognizant of all the facts and was not
placed at a disadvantage in properly defending the action.
Appeals and Jurisdiction. Prior to 1973 the Texas Constitution provided for
appellate jurisdiction in probate matters in the district court, 32 and section 5
of the Texas Probate Code3 3 provided for appellate jurisdiction in all
probate matters to be vested in the district court. By amendment to the
Constitution, the legislature was given the power to confer original and
appellate jurisdiction in probate matters. Pursuant to this constitutional
amendment the legislature amended Probate Code sections 5 and 21. The
amended section 534 permitted transfer of contested probate proceedings
from the constitutional county court to the district court in counties without a
statutory county court. Moreover, all statutory county courts, except county
criminal courts, were given jurisdiction to hear probate matters. Section
2135 gives the right of trial by jury in all contested probate proceedings. All
final orders in all counties were appealable to the courts of civil appeals. The
legislature did not act on that portion of section 2836 which provided for the
31. TEx. R. Civ. P. 152.
32. TEx. CONST. art. V, § 3.

33. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5 (1956), as amended, (1973), as amended, (1975).
34. Id.§ 5 (1973), amending (1956), as amended, (1975).
35. Id. § 21 (1975).

36. Id. § 28 (1956), as amended, (1975).
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right of appeal from probate court to district court, or upon section 3037 or
article 1907,38 all of which provided for certiorari proceedings.
In Cluck v. Hester39 the supreme court had before it important questions
relating to the 1973 amendments to the Probate Code. The matter came
before the court in a mandamus proceeding seeking an order to the district
judge to dismiss an application for writ of certiorari which attacked an order
of the county court denying probate of a will. Speaking for the court,
Justice Reavley traced the history of the distinction between appeal and
certiorari, and held that article 1907 and section 30 remained in effect and
the writ of certiorari in the district court was, therefore, still available.
The matter came before the Texas Legislature again in 1975, and section
30 and article 1907 were repealed, 40 thus extinguishing the result of Cluck
v. Hester.4 1 Section 542 was amended to provide that in contested probate
matters in those counties with no statutory court exercising the jurisdiction of
a probate court the judge may on his own motion or on the motion of any
party to the proceeding transfer the proceeding to the district court. Upon
resolution of the contested matter the district court shall transfer the matter
back to the county court for further proceedings. In those counties with a
statutory court all contested matters shall be heard in such court. In all
cases with final orders from courts exercising original probate jurisdiction
appeals are made to the court of civil appeals.
Rodriguez v. Valdez43 involved the question of whether the appellants
could base their appeal on a nunc pro tunc order, since appeal from the
original judgment had not been timely perfected. Holding that the judgment
nunc pro tunc was null and void, the court of civil appeals noted that under
rule 316 44 only clerical errors may be corrected and that under rule
329b(5) 45 the original judgment had become final before entry of the order
46
nunc pro tunc.
Independent Administration-FinalAccounting. In Burke v. Satterfield4 7
the decedent's wife Lela in 1966 offered her husband's will for probate, and
37. id.§ 30 (1956) (repealed 1975).
38. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1907 (1964) (repealed 1975).

39. 521 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. 1975).

40. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5 (1975).
41. 521 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. 1975).
42. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5 (1975).
43. 521 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
44. TEx. R. Civ. P. 316.
45. TEx. R. Civ. P. 329b(5).
46. Other cases involving questions of appeal and jurisdiction include: Christian v.
Howeth, 522 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (under
1973 amendment district court had no appellate jurisdiction from probate court; accordingly, appeal from district court to court of civil appeals was dismissed); accord, Estate
of Bourland v. Hanes, 526 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Leckow v. Moore, 524 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ);
Thomas v. Iliff, 524 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App.-Taxarkana 1975, no writ); Boyd v.
Dean, 515 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, no writ). See also Richards
v. Daniel, 518 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ) (county court's
judgment setting aside prior judgment was void because prior judgment of county court
had been appealed to district court which had tried matter de novo and rendered judgment).
47. 525 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1975).
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she duly qualified and was appointed independent executrix. Robert, the
decedent's son by a prior marriage, filed in the probate court on August 8,
1973, a demand for an accounting pursuant to section 149A of the Texas
Probate Code. 48 On October 24, 1973, the independent executrix filed a
"Final Accounting" and prayed the court, after notice to all interested
parties, to ratify and approve the final accounting. The son, on January 31,
1974, filed numerous objections and exceptions to the final accounting. The
court of civil appeals, although recognizing that a probate court's control
over independent administration is strictly limited, concluded nevertheless
that the executrix, by asking that all interested parties be notified, thereby
invoked the potential jurisdiction 9of the probate court to determine the
4
correctness of the final accounting.
The supreme court held that the probate court had no authority to approve
or disapprove the final accounting. Further, the accounting submitted was
not a final accounting within the purview of probate code section 151 0 because there remained funds to be disbursed and the attached affidavit did
not positively and unqualifiedly represent the facts as disclosed to be true.
The court further held that under section 14551 the probate court's jurisdiction over independent executors was strictly limited, and such courts would
not have jurisdiction to consider either objections by a devisee that related
to a judgment in a prior independent proceeding in the district court or the
matter of the executor's commission.
Qualification. Section 69 of the Texas Probate Code 52 provides that if
a testator is divorced after making a will, then all provisions in the will
in favor of the testator's spouse or appointing such spouse to any fiduciary
capacity shall be null and void. In what appears to be a case of first
impression, the court of civil appeals held in Smith v. Smith"8 that, if the
divorced parties subsequently remarry each other, the section is inapplicable
and the surviving widow is not disqualified as executrix.
Attorneys' Fees. In Knebel v. Capital National Bank5 4 the decedent
Knebel was a fifty percent stockholder in 7-Up Bottling Company of Austin,
Inc. The other fifty percent was owned by Kuempel and others. In 1962
Knebel entered into a contract with the corporation whereby the corporation
was given an option to purchase the stock of a deceased stockholder at book
value. By his will executed in 1955 Knebel named the Capital National
Bank and Kuempel as independent co-executors. After Knebel's death the
corporation exercised the option to acquire the stock. The bank accepted a
cash payment and a note for the balance of the purchase price and delivered
the stock to the corporation. Later, several of the beneficiaries of Knebel's
estate expressed dissatisfaction with the price obtained for the stock, and the
48. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149A (1975).
49. Satterfield v. Burke, 514 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1974, writ
granted).
50. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 151 (1956).
51. Id. § 145 (1975).
52. Id. § 69 (1956).
53. 519 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd)
54. 518 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1974).
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bank filed suit for a construction of the option and a determination of the
book value of -the stock. Because of Kuempel's dual relationship as a coexecutor and officer, director, and stockholder of the corporation, the -trial
court rendered partial summary judgment declaring the transaction null and
void ab initio, and this judgment was affirmed by the court of civil
55
appeals.
In 1972 Kuempel resigned as independent co-executor of the Knebel
estate and the bank then filed an action to determine if -the option could be
exercised. The trial court determined that the option was not exercisable
and that the bank was entitled to recover attorneys' fees for the services
rendered. As to the beneficiaries of the estate, the trial court denied
recovery out of the estate for attorneys' fees, and the court of civil appeals
affirmed. 56
The supreme court held that it was not shown as a matter of law that the
Knebel estate would gain a benefit or suffer a detriment as a result of the
litigation, and since the court of civil appeals had not considered the benefit
or detriment question, the cause was remanded to that court for a determination of that issue. The court also held that, if the court of civil appeals
should determine that the evidence supports an implied finding of no benefit,
it should affirm -the trial court. On the other hand, if the court of civil
appeals should determine that an implied finding of no benefit is not
supported by the evidence, the case should be remanded to the trial court for
the exercise of its equitable powers in determining the extent to which the
estate will be benefitted and the fees allocable therefor. The supreme court
also denied a claim of reimbursement for attorneys' fees against the executors. On remand the court of civil appeals held that there was insufficient1
evidence on the benefit-detriment question and remanded for a new trialA

In another case involving attorneys' fees, Russell v. Moeling,58 the
decedent died leaving two wills. The executrix under the earlier will was
successful in offering that will for probate, but upon appeal the later will was
admitted to probate. The executrix under the earlier will then applied for
allowance of attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in her unsuccessful
attempt to have the earlier will probated. The probate court allowed such
attorneys' fees, but the district court granted the administrator under the
second will a summary judgment denying recovery. The court of civil
appeals reversed and remanded, requiring the lower court to make findings
with respect to "good faith" and "just cause" which are necessary to the
55. 7-Up Bottling Co. of Austin, Inc. v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 505 S.W.2d 624 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
56. Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 505 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974,
writ granted).
57. Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 523 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
58. 526 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. 1975), rev'g sub nom. Estate of Cherry, 517 S.W.2d 912

(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974); see Huff v. Huff, 132 Tex. 540, 124 S.W.2d 327 (1939).
See also Park v. Hominick, 522 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no

writ); Humane Soc'y v. Austin Nat'l Bank, 517 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974), afI'd, 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 93 (Dec. 13, 1975).
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award of ,attorneys' fees and expenses for an executor. 59 The supreme court
reversed the judgment of the court of civil appeals and affirmed the
judgment of the district court. The court pointed out that the executrix
under the earlier will had employed counsel under a contingent fee arrangement, and since she was unsuccessful, she would owe nothing. Moreover,
the court held that the issues of good faith and just cause should have been
raised in the original probate proceedings.
Administrator-Liabilityfor Loss. In Frost National Bank v. KaytonG0 a
bank was appointed temporary administrator of -the decedent's estate in
1969. The bank failed to secure extended coverage protection on certain
estate property. After the bank had served about a year, Kayton, -the
grandfather of the deceased's minor son, made application to become
permanent administrator and on July 29, 1970, executed the oath, filed his
bond, and duly qualified as the permanent administrator. On August 3,
1970, a hurricane did severe damage to properties owned by the estate in
Port Aransas, Texas. The court of civil appeals held that the evidence
supported a jury finding that the bank was negligent in not acquiring
extended coverage and that the loss should be borne by it and not the
permanent administrator. The case was remanded to determine the cost of
repairs.
Contract of Sale-Death of Vendee. In Furman v. Sancheze' vendor
Furman entered into an executory contract of sale in 1964 under which Mrs.
Sanchez was to make certain monthly payments. Mrs. Sanchez died on
August 26, 1970, and the payments became delinquent. On April 7, 1971,
Furman terminated the contract and entered into another contract. The
question was whether Furman should have proceeded through an administration of the estate of the buyer. The court, citing Pearce v. Stokes,6 2 held
that the vendor could not terminate the contract within four years of the buyer's death without an administration of the buyer's estate, and that the
administrator had the right to void the termination or seek damages for its
termination. The court fashioned an award based on the fair market value
of the property less the amount still owing from the decedent.
Heirship. In Davis v. Davis6 3 Charles married Mary Nell in 1966 in Texas.
In 1967 he left without her for Australia, then to Iran, and in August 1968
he was transferred to Singapore. On October 2, 1968, a Buddhist wedding
ceremony was performed uniting Charles and Nancy and they lived in
Singapore until Charles was killed by shipwreck on December 24, 1970.
Approximately one month after the death of Charles both Mary Nell and
59. Estate of Cherry, 517 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974), rev'd sub
nom. Russell v. Moeling, 526 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. 1975).
60. 526 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.c.).

61. 523 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
62.

155 Tex. 564, 291 S.W.2d 309 (1956).

See also Radford v. Coker, 519 S.W.2d

934 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ) (one cotenant cannot burden the property
with debts, force a foreclosure, and then purchase the entire interest).
63. 521 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1975). This was a landmark case in the area of family
law. See McKnight Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 96
(1975).

See also Deveroex v. Nelson, 529 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. 1975).
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Nancy gave birth to daughters. The supreme court held that Nancy was not
the lawful widow of Charles. Although there is a presumption that Charles
and Mary Nell were divorced prior to the wedding of Charles and Nancy,
Mary Nell presented evidence showing no divorce in Texas, Australia, or
Singapore, and this was held sufficient to rebut the presumption. However,
the court held that Nancy was the putative wife of Charles, having entered
into and continued the relationship in good faith and that Nancy was,
therefore, entited to the same rights in the property acquired during her
relationship with Charles as if she were his lawful wife. As to the legitimacy
of Mary Nell's daughter, Mary Nell herself gave testimony with respect to
non-access by Charles during the time when the child might have been
conceived. Mr. Justice Reavley, for the court, traced the history of Lord
Mansfield's Rule which precludes testimony of husband or wife to the effect
that a child born during the marriage is not that of the husband. 64 The
court rejected the Rule because it could find no reason for continuing to
support a legal proposition which prevents the discovery of the truth.
II.

TRUSTS

Construction. In Becknal v. Atwood65 a grantor created in 1960 an
irrevocable trust with a ten-year duration for the benefit of his three
children. His wife was appointed primary trustee and, in the event of her
inability to serve, a bank was named as substitute trustee. The trustee was
given powers of management and disposition of the income and corpus for
the support and education of the beneficiaries. The trust contained a
spendthrift clause prohibiting a beneficiary from alienating corpus of or
income from the trust estate. The grantor conveyed certain realty to the
trust, and in 1965 the three named beneficiaries executed a warranty deed
conveying interests in a tract of realty from the trust to their mother for life
and then to their father for life. The father died in 1969. In 1974 one of
the beneficiaries brought a declaratory judgment to construe the trust
instrument with particular reference to the effect of the spendthrift clause.
Among other issues the court pointed out that all parties to the trustgrantor, trustee, and beneficiaries-could effect a modification or termination of the trust. In this case the parties had joined in conveying a life estate
to their mother but had not terminated the trust. Accordingly, the court
held that upon termination of the trust in 1970 the realty conveyed vested in
the three children subject to the life estate of their mother. 60
64. Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777). See also Flavin v. Flavin, 523
S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1975, no writ) (widow of common
law marriage has right to widow's allowance).
65. 518 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ). See also Weatherly
v. Byrd, 519 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ) (jurisdiction over

trust is in district court).
66. See also Moody v. Moody Nat'l Bank, 522 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (once assignment is validly made, spendthrift
clause does not preclude further assignments); Fewell v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 513
S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (inclusion of settlor as
a spendthrift beneficiary does not give settlor right to revoke trust where other beneficiaries were properly included under the spendthrift clause).
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In another construction case, Byrd v. Caruth,67 a testamentary trust
provided that upon the death of the testator's wife, the entire net income was
to be paid to his daughter's children. In a suit for construction the court
held that undistributed income of the daughter's trust belonged to the
daughter's estate at her death and that such amounts could not be carried
forward in trust for the daughter's children.
In Humane Society v. Austin National Bank6 8 the corporate trustee
invested trust assets in its own fully secured certificates of deposit for a
period of sixteen months. The Humane Society, beneficiary of the trust,
accused the trustee of self-dealing, but the court held that the investments
were proper. The court reasoned that the greater security afforded by the
certificates of deposit justified the loss of interest income which might have
been earned had the trust assets been placed into higher risk investments.
Constructive Trust. In Meadows v. Bierschwale 9 vendors referred to as
Bierschwale sold an apartment complex to Oakes in return for fifty-nine
notes. Oakes transferred the apartment complex to his wholly-owned
corporation, United Properties, Inc. United Properties transferred the property to Goldman, a bona fide purchaser, for cash and notes. Meadows, a
real estate broker, represented Bierschwale. At Bierschwale's request,
Oakes transferred certain notes due the vendors to Meadows for his sales
commission. In the trial court Oakes was found guilty of fraud in misrepresenting the facts concerning the fifty-nine notes given in consideration of the
first sale.
The supreme court held that, as the sale to Oakes was procured by fraud
on the part of Oakes, Bierschwale was entitled to a constructive trust on the
proceeds of the sale to Goldman, which in turn was construed to mean the
Goldman notes plus a money judgment for cash received. The benefits of
the constructive trust were extended to Meadows. The court also held that
Bierschwale's constructive trust right arose prior to the right of Smith, a
creditor of Oakes who took seven of the Goldman notes as security for a
prior obligation.
Rescission. Stephens County Museum, Inc. v. Swenson70 involved two
elderly Swenson sisters and their older brother. The brother in 1967
employed an attorney to draft testamentary trusts to care for the sisters and
67. 520 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also
Currie v. Currie, 518 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ dism'd) (income not distributable does not become part of community estate of distributee).
68. 517 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974), alf'd, 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 93
(Dec. 13, 1975). This case stems from the controversy involved in the related case,
City of Austin v. Austin Nat'l Bank, 503 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. 1973). See Galvin, Wills
and Trusts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 19, 25 (1975).
69. 516 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974). On constructive trusts arising out of fiduciary
relationships see Huffington v. Upchurch, 523 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1975), severed, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 138 (Jan. 21,
1976). Seegers v. Spradley, 522 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Patton v. Callaway, 522 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Maykus v. First City Realty & Fin. Corp., 518 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1974, no writ).
70. 517 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. 1974).
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their brother and his wife. Following their deaths, the trust would be used
for charitable purposes in Stephens County. In 1969 the Stephens County
Museum, a non-profit corporation, was organized, and the sisters made cash
contributions totaling $100,000, conveyed a 1,761-acre tract subject to a
lifetime lease, and executed a trust involving the 5,777-acre Swenson ranch
for the maintenance of the Swensons with the remainder of the net income
being used for the museum. The sisters consulted an attorney who advised
them that they had given away their entire estate, and they then sued to set
aside all contributions.
The trial court found no undue influence as to the first cash contribution.
With respect to the deed to the 1,761-acre tract, the court found no delivery
of the deed. These holdings were affirmed by the supreme court. Concerning the second cash contribution and conveyance of the 5,777-acre tract, the
supreme court remanded these issues to the trial court for determination of
whether the Swenson brother acted as a fiduciary, whether he fully informed

his sisters of the nature and effect of the transactions, and whether the
sisters' actions were the result of voluntary and intelligent action.
III.

TAXATION

Unrelated Business Income. In State National Bank v. United States71 a
bank as trustee of a charitable trust paid deficiencies in income tax on
unrelated business income and brought suit for a refund. The trust owned a
2,875-acre irrigated farm which it leased to Calhoun under terms which
made the lessor-trust responsible for maintenance and repair of improvements, and for furnishing tools, labor, and seed to the lessee. The Fifth Circuit held that there was an issue as to whether this arrangement was a management contract or a rental agreement. Accordingly, a directed verdict for
72
taxpayer was held improper and the case was remanded for trial.
Life Estate-Depreciation. In Kuhn v. United States73 the taxpayer widow
was put to an election under her husband's will and exchanged her interest in
their community property for a life interest in the entire community estate.
Because the value of what she gave up was greater than the value she
received, she paid gift tax on the excess. The Federal District Court for the
Southern District of Texas held that the widow was entitled to amortize her
basis against the income received from her husband's portion of the life estate.
IV.

LEGISLATION

Gifts from Estates of Incompetents. A new subsection of section 230 of the
Texas Probate Code provides that on application of a guardian or any
interested party, after notice, and upon a showing that the ward will
71. 509 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1975).
72. See also Fort Worth Nat'l Bank v. 'United States, 396 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Tex.
1975) (pre-1969 charitable remainder allowed in part as deduction).
73.

392 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D. Tex. 1975).

See also Gist v. United States, 423 F.2d

1118 (9th Cir. 1970); McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
25 Sw. L.J. 34, 53 (1971).
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probably remain incompetent, the court may authorize gifts from the ward's
estate. 74 The ward's intentions are to be ascertained, if possible, but he will
be presumed to favor reduction of inheritance taxes by partial distributions
of his estate.
Inheritance Tax Procedures. A new procedure for the handling of small
and nontaxable estates has been developed by the state comptroller's
office. 7 5 As of July 16, 1975, the comptroller will no longer require county
clerks to send copies of wills and inventories to the Inheritance Tax Division,
but the clerk will give a short report on each estate. New forms for estates
under $60,000 are available from the Inheritance Tax Division.
Uniform Gifts to Minors. Several amendments have expanded the Texas
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act to treat Texas credit unions as if they were
banks, and the definition of custodial property has been enlarged. 76 The
new rules provide for the appointment of a successor custodian including
designation of the successor by a resigning custodian, donor, guardian,
parent, or adult member of the minor's family.
Examination of Estates by Court. Section 36 of the Texas Probate Code is
amended to relieve the county or probate judge from examining each estate,
but now requires examination only if, in the court's opinion, it is necessary. 77
Small Estates. Section 137 of the Texas Probate Code now provides that
estates not exceeding $5000 may be distributed on affidavit of the distributees.78
Employees' Trusts. New amendments alter the law governing trusts forming
part of stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plans 79 under section 401 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.80 Payments may be made to inter
vivos and testamentary trustees. If the trustee makes no claim for the death
benefit within a period of one year after the death of the employee, payment
shall be made as required or permitted by such employee's beneficiary
designation, the plan or the retirement annuity contract, or, failing such
designation, to the personal representative of the deceased employee as part
of the employee's estate. Such payments are exempt from taxes and debts.

74. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 230(b) (Supp. 1975-76).
75. See TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. arts. 14.13 (1969), 14.14 (Supp. 1975-76).
76. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5923-101 (Supp. 1975-76).
77. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 36 (Supp. 1975-76).
78. Id. § 137.

79. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7425d-1 (Supp. 1975-76).
80. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401.

